Media: Is there room for a liberal party?

By Yavuz Baydar, 8.11.2010, Today's Zaman The question stemmed from the an assertion by Ms. Marietje Schaake, a European liberal politician, who while in İstanbul recently raised many wise points in narrowing the gap between the people of Turkey and Europeans in general. She is, of course, right in her diagnosis. Turkey has suffered much from a lack of clear-cut diversification in its political sphere, which has, up until today, led to dialogue that features only those with “identity” problems from the Turkish side. Liberals of Turkey have been for decades at large. Despite the fact that some of the ideology’s main notions been inherent, vaguely, in certain periods (say in the 50s and the 80s), they could only be sources of inspiration and their ideas have been “imported” by pragmatist leaders like Turgut Özal, but on selective basis. Due to a lack of civilian courage or unwillingness to challenge the dogmatic establishment in Ankara, mainly the ideas of economic liberalism were subject to promotion. Yet, as a result of progress on economic liberalism, there was a slow, and firm, rise of political liberalism. The past seven or so years have been proof of that fact. But the liberals are still at large. There are many elements in the background to explain that. When the staunch implementation of Kemalism merged with the ideology of the Cold War, there was little room for pushing an agenda to enhance freedoms and rights. The main challenge in the early stages of the Cold War in Turkey was the one between the socialists and the Marxists and the conservative right, which refused to bring Turkey closer to Western norms of rights and freedoms. Under a semi-command economy, the upper classes were happy enough to strike a chord with the bureaucracy in Ankara, and as long as their business thrived on state support, there was no need for them to strive for a fully open market that had to come with the “free bazaar of ideas.” They chose to abide by the rules set by Ankara, and liberalism’s entry was delayed constantly. Therefore, Turks became acquainted with liberal thinkers like Hayek or Popper, and others, in different segments of society only as late as the end of the 1960s. As part of Turkey’s paradoxes, they were introduced to them by Marxists, who had already been disillusioned with Soviet or Chinese models, and in particular how the uprisings in Hungary and Tsjekkoslovakia had been “handled.” Yet, even these efforts were overshadowed by the harsh, often brutal confrontations between the armed leftist and ultranationalist groups and gangs, and dangerous power plays within the “shadow state” between various factions that claimed to hold the “patent” to Kemalism. In a nutshell, until after the brutal military coup of 1980, there was no room for a liberal formation. The ideas would again, after the 1983 elections, gain popularity by the tireless efforts of Özal, but fall dramatically short on the political side of reform. The fact became clearer when, emerging as victorious under the tutelage of the army, Kemalists -- and their support base within society -- escalated their hatred for liberalism, after the collapse of worldwide socialistic practices. This had to do with the creeping fear that liberalism with its democratic agenda would step by step expose and push back the reign of tutelage, densely painted by a lifelong discourse of “the world against Turkey” doctrine. Internalization of the state ideology, often unconsciously, by the masses -- through education, military service and the media -- has been very helpful when the emerging segment of liberals that have distanced themselves from the left and Islamism were subjected to constant bashing. Today’s liberals, still at large, constitute a voluntary group of advisers, for those movements which want to listen. There are some parties that carry the name on their registrations but they are still polluted by indecisions on how to confront the inherited undemocratic ideas of Kemalism and by nationalism (on issues such as Armenia, Greece, etc.). The question for Turkey’s “loose” liberals have for three decades seemed to remain unchanged. They show, time after time, a resolve for seeking paths and ways to enhance the agenda, and prefer to remain an outside advisors, instead of remaining under the spotlight in a party formation. Their motto is the same as before: Unless there is a civilized redesign of the democratic order of Turkey under a modern constitution, there will be no room for fair and civilized competition and diversity in politics. Once this is done, there will be time for a search for modern identities that can boldly approach the realities of Turkey. Needless to say, this has a lot to do with where the internal search for a new identity for the CHP will end; the more social democratic it will become, the more room for liberals to seek their own channels.